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The purpose of this ' report is to give a general picture of the activities of the
Monetary Committee of the European Economic Community. The Committee
itself held twelve meetings in  1964,  while the Committee of Alternates and the
working parties set up by the main Committee during the year to examine the
monetary and financial situations of the member countries also met on a number
f occasions.
Article  of its Statute provides that: "The Committee shall elect from among
its members, by majorities comprising not less than eight votes, a chairman and
two vice-chairmen for a term of two years. These officers of the Committee
having completed their term, the Committee unanimously elected jonkheer
Mr.  E.  van Lennep, Treasurer-General in the Netherlands Ministry of Finance, as
chairman and  M. B.  Clappier, second Vice-Governor of the Bank of France, and
Dr.  O.  Emminger, a member of the Bundesbank Direktorium, as vice-chairmen. A
list of members is appended to this Report.
In  1964  the Committee co-operated even more closely than in the past with the
other Community committees and authorities. The chairman attended  or  was
represented at all the meetings of the Short-term Economic Policy Committee,
and the chairmen of these two Committees took part in the periodic meetings of
the Ministers of Finance. The chairman also participated in the discussions in
the BEC Council devoted to the Council's Recommendation for measures to be
taken to restore the internal and external economic equilibrium of the Community.
This report was completed on  February  1965.  It therefore does not take into
account economic developments or measures adopted after that date, whether
within the Community or, for example, in the United States.Chapter I
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
ON THE CO-ORDINATION OF MONETARY POLICIES
1. Although 1964 was not a year of spectacular developments, the grad-
ual process of monetary integration within the European Economic
Community advanced in a number of fields. The monetary authorities
made every endeavour, when implementing their domestic policies and
when taking decisions or fixing their attitudes on matters more concerned
with the international sphere, to carry economic union between the six
Member States a stage further. The co-ordination of their activity in
this direction is one of the main tasks of the Committee; it must also
see that integration develops in a climate of economic and monetary
stability within the Community and of constructive co-operation with the
outside world.
2. The general economic development of the Community  with the
imbalances that appeared in 1963 and began to recede towards the end
of 1964 - has illuminated the considerable degree of interdependence
already reached by the economies of the Member States. Inflationary
pressures originating in certain member countries spread very rapidly
to the other countries of the Community, impairing the internal balance
of these countries also. The problem of financing the de.ficits has not
been critical in the Community, since it disposes of ample foreign
exchange reserves. In the circumstances, the right solution to the
n contamination n problem lay in the implementation of adjustment policies
designed to remedy the causes of imbalance.
When on 15 April 1964 the Council adopted, on a proposal from the Com-
mission, a common and generalized anti-inflation programme  the
implementation of which it is now watching - it showed a correct appre-
ciation of what the situation required. The Committee, which helped
elaborate the Recommendation put forward by the Council and is closely
associated with its implementation, attaches the greatest importance to
this first joint decision on the main lines of the economic and .financial
policy to be pursued by the competent authorities of the Community
member countries.
3. Discussions on international monetary problems, in which the member
countries have taken an active part, have also Shown how necessary it is
to secure close co-ordination between the policies followed by these
countries. In accordance with the practice introduced some years ago
and to which the Council's decision of 8 May 1964 gave a formal basis,
the Cor, :ttee has done everything in its power to promote such co-
ordinati.  One example is its work in connection with the preparation
of the 2 LUdy on the general functioning of the international monetary
system and on international liquidity problems, which was published in
1964 by the n Group of Ten n, and another is its action when certainquestions arose relating to the International Monetary Fund, such as the
provision of additional resources for this institution and the IMF' s call
on the " General Arrangements to Borrow II when the United Kingdom
made a drawing on the IMF.
4. In 1964 the Committee also discussed the monetary problems involved
in the working out of a common agricultural policy - to be applied from
July 1967 onwards - notably in the fixing of common farm prices. The
Committee has consequently had to express their views on the monetary
implications of the fixing of common farm prices and whether these
prices should be expressed in units of accounts or otherwise.
5. Developments in the three fields referred to above are discussed in
more detail below.
6. At regular intervals the Committee has examined the .economic and
monetary situation in the member countries~ and the results of these
examinations will be outlined in Chapter II. It should be recalled here
that early in 1964 both France and Italy were suffering from clearly in-
flationary movements and that strains had grown severer in the Benelux
countries, while the Federal Republic of Germany was enjoying conditions
of near stability; a very heavy deficit on current account in Italy con-
trasted with a considerable surplus in the Federal Republic: in the first
quarter of 1964 the surplus in the Federal Republic was ~425 million.
Gross gold and foreign exchange reserves ofthe Bank of Italy had dwindled
by ~235 million in the same period.
The main source of these payments disequilibria was intra-Community
trade. In the first quarter of 1964, for example, the Federal Republic
surplus on trade with the other Community countries was nearly ~200
million higher than in the same quarter of 1963, while in Italy the deficit
on trade with the other EEC countries was nearly ~70 million heavier
than a year before.
7. These facts not only indicated that economic trends in the various
member countries were out of phase, but - and this is more important 
that by a contamination process excess demand was spreading from one
country to another. This was a threat to the internal stability of the
economies of all member countries and might have meant that inflationary
strain had come to stay in all six countries~ thus undermining the Com-
munity s external position. The new trend also raised a series of polit-
ical problems, since if balance-of-payments difficulties had got out of
hand they might have endangered the internal cohesion of the Community.
8. When carrying out its periodic examination of the economic situation
in the member countries, the Committee had drawn the attention of the
Council and of the Commission to the need for the Member States to
co-ordinate their policies and to strengthen the measures adopted to
adjust these trends and to bring inflation under control. It had, in par-
ticular, emphasized the direct impact of any serious strains in one
country on the economy of theentire Community. It was the development
of such strains, on a scale which had been particularly pronounced in thecase of Italy, which had led the Commission to initiate, in agreement
with the Italian authorities, the procedure laid down in Article 108 of the
Treaty. In accordance with the provisions of this article, the Community
authorities recommended the adoption of an adjustment policy aimed at
the prompt and effective correction of inflationary tendencies.
The EEC Council, faced with the threatening situation in the Community,
adopted a Recommendation, dated 15 April 1964, which calls on the Member
States to take action with a view to the re-establishment of the internal
and external equilibrium of the Community. The Council adopted in this
document the principle of giving stability of prices and costs priority
over all other economic policy objectives. The Recommendation specifies
the means to be employed, and lays down in particular that the expansion
of public expenditure should not exceed 5 % per ann un. What is significant
is that here, for the first time, a decision was taken establishing a scale
of priorities and giving rules backed by figures. This joint decision on
the main lines of the economic and financial policies to be pursued in the
member countries of the Community also gave the authorities in .each of
the countries considerable additional support in their fight against
inflation.
9. In general the policies pursued by the Member States have been in line
with the Recommendation. Among the measures adopted, the following
may be noted: in France, maintenance of the action initiated early in
1963 to contain the expansion of credit, and curbing of the expansion in
public expenditure, thanks to which budget transactions yielded a surplus
in 1964; in Italy, the implementation of a restrictive monetary policy
during the first half of 1963, the increasing of a number of indirect taxes
and the limitation of the growth of central government expenditure;
in the Federal Republic, the curtailing of the expansion of central gov-
ernment expenditure, steps taken by the Bundesbank to encourage exports
of short-term capital as part of a more restrictive monetary policy, the
advance reduction of rates of duty on imports from Community countries
and the announcement of the decision to levy a tax on securities held by
non-residents; in the Netherlands, the increasing of certain indirect
taxes, the spreading over a longer period of public works programmes,
the application of a restrictive monetary policy, and the limitation of
the expenditure of local authorities; in Belgium, the strengthening of
price supervision, the introduction of credit restrictions, the spreading
over a longer period of public investment expenditure, the curbing of the
increase in overall central government expenditure and the introduction
of more stringent terms for the granting of loans for building and for
hire-purchase sales.
10. The total effect of the measures taken by the Member States was a
gradual move back towards equilibrium.
The deficit on the Community s trade balance, which was still growing
at the beginning of 1964, started to decline towards the middle of the
year. Trade between the member countries developed on appreciably
more balanced lines: the surplus on the Federal Republic s trade,
which had been running at nearly ~400 million in the fourth quarter of
1963, fell to about ~40 million in the last quarter of 1964. At the same
time, the heavy deficit of ~200 million on Italy s trade was replaced bysurplus of ~70 million, and the Netherlands deficit fell appreciably
(~25 million in the last quarter of 1964, against ~130 million in the
fourth quarter of 1963). For the full year 1964 the Community as a
whole had a. surplus on current account somewhere between ~200 million
and ~500 million. Monetary reserves (i.e. net gold and foreign exchange holdings of the banking system plus claims on the IMF) rose sharply; the increase was about ~1500 million. The increase in the monetary
reserves of the Community countries was therefore largely due to net
imports of capital.
11. In the Benelux countries, and to a lesser extent in Italy, the upward
thrust of consumer prices eased as the year wore on, while in the Federal
Republic and France it was relatively mild from the start. There was
also a tendency for the rise in unit production costs to level out.
It should, however, be observed that the upward price movement has not
yet been brought to a halt; in 1965, an increase of some 3-4% for the
Community as a whole is to be feared.
Experience in the past year has shown that inflationary trends cannot
successfully be fought unless a wide range of instruments is available
to those responsible for monetary policy, public finance policy and wag. policy. It would seem that in some member countries the means used
were not sufficiently diversified and that too much emphasis was con-
sequentlyplaced on monetary measures.
12. That inflationary tendencies within the Community should have
coincided with an increase in monetary reserves raises the question how far strains occurring in the Community can be put down to II im-
ported inflation , I.e. the transmission of inflationary pressures through the balance of payments. Now, an increase in short-term claims on
abroad is apt to lead to an increase in money supply at home. However
the authorities are not entirely helpless in the face of this phenomenon, for by using the various instruments available to them they can put a
brake on the formation of domestic liquidity.
But the contraction of domestic liquidity is no easy task when the pay- ments surplus affects domestic demand directly, as it does when it derives from a surplus on current account or from a net inflow of capital for certain kinds of direct investment. In principle, a policy of neutral-
izing inflationary forces from abroad will encounter fewer obstacles
when the surplus stems from purely .financial transactions, although beyond certain limits its implementation becomes increasingly diffi- cult. In any case, as long as the accumulation of gold and foreign ex-
change reserves continues, it is not easy to convince public opinion of the need to accept some degree of discipline.
Although inflation in the Community was in the past due in part to the effects of developments abroad, it should be noted that more recently,
and especially during the last two years. the pressure from outside has eased. Inflation is now due mainly to trends originating in the member
countries themselves, and it must be fought with domestic measures.13. Apart from the effects of the recent speculation against the pound
sterling, the main counterparts in 1964, as in previous years, of the
surpluses of the EEC countries were the continuing deficits of the United
States balance of payments, and more especially US exports of capital.
This problem is being studied in various quarters, and there have been a
number of suggestions on how it should be remedied.
The suggestions sometimes lay emphasis on weaknesses in the organization
of certain European capital markets; it is argued that if the markets
were operated more efficiently,  better equilibrium in international
movements of capital could be achieved. It is true that such adjustments
are indispensable in the interests of the harmonious development of the
Community itself, given that some of these markets are still suffering
from the disturbances and in particular from the inflation by which they
were beset in the two postwar periods. But even if such structural
improvements had, in the near future, all the hoped-for effects, they
would make only a limited contribution to solving the problem posed by
the Community s need to step up its exports of capital, particularly to
the developing countries. The Community s role as net exporter of
capital is particularly important at the present time in view of the per-
sistent net inflow of capital.
1 4. For it must not be forgotten that capital movements towards the
Community countries are encouraged by the continued availability of
relatively ample funds on the American capital market. The question
therefore arises as to what should be the attitude of the Community
countries towards the recurrent deficits on the United States balance of
payments. This problem has since 1960 been the subject of many inter-
national discussions at which the American authorities have presented
programmes designed to bring their balance of payments into equilibrium.
The execution of these programmes has achieved appreciable results;
the surplus on current account last year is thought to have been of the
order of ~8 000 million. It is doubtful whether it will be wise or desirable
to work towards a further increase in a surplus of this magnitude. Be-
tween 1960 and 1964 the balance of all transactions on current account
and of government transactions of all kinds showed a net improvement of
about ~3 000 million. But during the same period the balance of capital
transactions deteriorated by about ~2 000 million net.
15. There is therefore no doubt that capital transactions are the item
which calls for attention if the American deficit is to be corrected. 
is hard to see how this can be done as long as the American capital
markets enjoy their present ample supplies of funds. Accordingly it is
pertinent to inquire how far it is right for the Member States to contrib-
ute, through the accumulation of short-term claims on the United States,
to the financing of a payments deficit due at least in part to an outflow of
capital which, because much of it finds its way into the Community, is
liable to hamper the stabilization drive in the six countries.
16. In this respect it should be noted that in 1964 the American deficit was
financed largely through the holding of dollars by developing countries,
which can be expected to use part of these increased funds in 1965 to step
up their purchases. If and in so far as the dollar holdings of the devel-
oping countries are transferred to Community countries, which usuallyhold a large share of their reserves in gold, the United States might find
itself required to cope not only with the problem of financing the 1965
deficit, but also with the need to refinance that of 1964.
17. Last year the Committee exchanged views on a number of occasions
in connection with the decision to place special resources at the disposal
of the IMF under the General Arrangements to Borrow.
The General Arrangements were called into play because the United
Kingdom  faced with a 1964 payments deficit of some .f800 million, or
more than ~2 200 million  drew ~l 000 million on the IMF. Since the
assistance rendered under the General Arrangements comes largely from
the Community countries (~335 million out of a total of ~405 million) and
since the Central Banks of these countries also contributed a large share
of the international assistance which it subsequently proved necessary to
afford the Bank of England, consultations are still needed within the
Monetary Committee on the attitude to be adopted by Member States in
their talks with the United Kingdom authorities and in the IMF.
1 8.. The Member States of the Community have a direct interest in the
pursuit by the British authorities of a policy ensuring the re-establishment
of equilibrium in the United Kingdom balance of payments. This is because
this account must be brought back into balance if serious disturbances in
the international monetary system are to be avoided, and also because the
United Kingdom deficits add to the inflationary pressures that still persist
in the Community. Moreover if the freedom of international trade built
up at the price of considerable effort since the end of the second world war . is to be maintained, the UK import surcharge must be dropped in the
near future.
19. Consultations have also been held in the Committee concerning the
general raising of IMF quotas. It has examined the details of this operation
and more particularly the measures that might be taken to reduce the drain
on United States and United Kingdom reserves that may result from the
gold payments made to the Fund: those countries holding the greater part
of their reserves in dollars or in sterling might find it necessary, because
of the raising of their quotas, to convert reserve currency holdings into
gold so as to be able to discharge their obligations to the Fund.
20. The general raising of quotas, possibly accompanied by an additional
increase in the quotas of certain Community countries, would further swell
the resources which Member States are already placing at the disposal of the IMP. At the end of 1964, outstanding drawings on the IMF totalled
~2 622 million. Of this total, ~857 million was financed by IMF sales of
gold, while of the balance of ~1765 million, ~1473 million - more than
80 % - was in the form of drawings on Community currencies.
21. The Committee continued its consultations on the general working of
the international monetary system. A study was published last year by the
group of ten countries which had concluded the General Arrangements toBorrow with the IMF. As part of the General Arrangements they have
undertaken to procure special resources for the Fund in specific situations;
consultation in the Committee has meant that certain opinions held within
the Community' have been aired in discussions in the Group of Ten.
22. The Committee welcomes the agreement reached in the Group of Ten
on the usefulness of participating, through the international institutions
which are alrea.dy concerned with these problems, in a n multilateral
surveillance II of the ways and means of financing the balance-of-payments
disequilibria. Such surveillance is designed to help the monetary authorities
to avoid excesses or shortages in the means of financing surpluses or
deficits in the balance of payments, as well as to discuss measures ap-
propriate for each country in accordance with the general economic outlook.
The Committee also regards as noteworthy the conclusion reached by the
Group of Ten that the smooth functioning of the international monetary
system depends on the avoidance of major and persistent international
imbalances and on the effective use of appropriate policies by national
governments to correct them when they occur.
Lastly, the Committee feels it must stress the importance it attaches to
the constitution of a study group to examine various proposals regarding
the creation of reserve assets either through the IMF or otherwise. It
feels that this study is all the more important since there is no immediate
prospect of a currency of one of the six countries assuming the functioning
of an international reserve currency. Indeed" at the present junction such
a development could raise problems without substantially strengthening the
international monetary system.
23. On 15 December 1964, the Council adopted certain decisions concerning
the implementation of the common agricultural policy. The Committee
has examined the implications in the monetary field of the adoption of
common farm prices and the question of how these common prices should
be expressed.
24. The common agricultural market in its final stage, which should be
reached in 1967, involves the removal of all intra-Community obstacles
to the movement of farm produce, and the unity of the market will mean
a permanent arrangement for common prices throughout the Community.
The Committee has concluded that of the two methods of expressing
prices - in national currencies or in units of account - the unit-of-
account method is to be preferred, since it would afford an automatic
price safeguard in the event of any change in the cross rates between
member countries and would more firmly secure the working of the markets at Community level, particularly from the point of view of relations with
the outside world.
But the existence of common prices ar;td their expression in units of
account would mean that any such change, especially if it were on an
appreciable scale, could have major economic repercussions, since prices of agricultural commodities would change automatically andimmediately, and these changes would affect both farmers' incomes and
consumer prices.
25. The Committee therefore went into the question whether the adoption
of the unit of account would mean that the member .countries must forgo
their freedom to devalue or revalue their currencies - an important
instrument of monetary policy. It concluded that progressive integration
within the EEC, and particularly the tendency for the respective prices
of a growing number of products to settle at much the same level through-
out the Community, will make devaluation or revaluation increasingly
difficult and unlikely. The establishment of a single agricultural market
will strengthen this trend. However, the Comm ttee considered that
even so it would still be possible for a State to adjust the exchange rate
of its currency, should this prove necessary in order to safeguard, for
example, the smooth working of the Common Market itself.
26. Should this happen, it would be desirable for machinery to be avail-
able which could be used to soften the impact of the change.
The arrangement could be as follows: while the appropriate EEC
authorities examined as rapidly as possible the situation created by
devaluation or revaluation in the Community from both the agricultUral
and monetary points of view and took the necessary decisions - which
could, if this were deemed desirable, involve an adjustment to Com-
munity prices - interim measures might be taken to cushion the .impact of
the automatic changes in farm prices in the Member States concerned.
27. Although revaluation and devaluation within EEC have become more
difficult and unlikely, circumstances could still render the one or the
other unavoidable. Because of the common interest of Member States in
this sphere, suitable procedures must be agreed. For this reason the
Member States meeting in Council agreed in 1964 on the need for con-
sultation prior to any alteration in the rate of exchange of a Member
State' s currency, and that the Commission should take part in the dis-
cussions.
28. The prospects opened by the implementation of the common agricul-
tural policy and experience gained in the last two years in the fight against
inflation have brought out more clearly than before the natUre of the
evolutionary process of economic integration in the Community. 
integration gains ground, changes in overall demand, costs and prices in
one or more member countries make themselves felt with increasing
speed throughout the Community. Given that the economic .situation in
each member country depends on economic development in the Community
as a whole, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the authorities of a
Member State to influence their own economic development in isolation
by pursuing independent monetary, fiscal or incomes policies or by al-
tering their exchange rates. Should the internal balance of one or more
Member States be severely impaired, the stability of the Community as
a whole is more and more llkely to be threatened. The overall devel-
opment of the six Community countries between 1963 and 1964 shows how
far they have already travelled along the road to complete interdependence.De facto monetary integration is indeed constantly progressing, although
the process is not always immediately obvious.
29. Certain conclusions are to be drawn.
In the first place, the co-ordination of the policies pursued in the m.ember
countries must be intensified so that economic and financial developments
in each of the Community countries will stem from joint decisions rather
than be the fortuitous result of unco-ordinated decisions or chance events
in the Community. The Council's Recommendation of 15 April 1964, the
first recommendation common to all the countries, is, with its II 5 % rule
governing the annual increase in public spending, of particular signi-
ficance in this context. The application of thiS technique to the .other
components of economic equilibrium could now be contemplated. The
main lines of the policy to be pursued in the Member States - not only in
the field of public finance but also in other fields, such as those of
monetary policy and incomes policy - should as far .as possible be backed
up with actual figures in the recommendations. If this were done, common
standards would be bound to emerge.
30. While it has been proving increasingly necessary to co-ordinate the
economic policies of Member States within the Community, harmonization
of their attitudes to external problems has also been acquiring fresh
urgency. The fact that in recent years Member States have shouldered
almost the entire burden of financing IMF operations highlights the need
to solve these problems, and although in the past consultation has not
yielded .agreement on every occasion, the passage of time is rendering
the need for prior agreement on issues among the EEC countries steadily
greater.
There is no shortage of examples to illustrate this need. Should, for
instance, the current influx of capital into the Community persist, 
might lead to further payments surpluses and so engender inflationary
pressure, making it necessary to seek out suitable ways and means of
encouraging capital exports and of neutralizing the effect of capital
imports on internal liquidity. Compensatory measures of this kind can
never be completely effective, and it is therefore of overriding importance
to put a brake on excess imports of capital from non-member countries,
especially as the size and composition of the monetary reserves held by
the Member States are already a problem which would undoubtedly be
made even more acute by such a development.
Another important task for the Committee will be that of securing close
co-ordination when the Group of Ten s report on the creation of fresh
reserVeS is presented and when the ministers and the governors of the
Central Banks of these ten countries are deciding on the most appropriate
solution to the problem of providing the world with monetary reserves.Chapter II
POSITION IN THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBER COUNTRI ES
AND MAIN FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Generally speaking 1964 was, despite the very rapid pace of economic
expansion, a year in which relative stability was maintained within the
Federal Republic of Germany and equilibrium was restored in its external
balance of payments.
Expansion was sustained by the very high level of exports and, more
recently, by the upsurge in domestic demand, notably investment demand;
the gross investment of enterprises rose 9% (volume), compared with
1% in 1963. Private consumers' expenditure .also grew more rapidly
(5.3% in volume), though its progress, like that of public consumption,
lagged behind the increase in GNP which, at constant prices,. expanded
much faster than in 1963: the figures are 6.5% and 3. 2% respectively.
The maintenance of relative stability was mainly due to the successful
economic policy pursued by the Federal authorities. It was facilitated
by the action taken in certain member countries to combat inflationary
pressure, as this reduced the demand for goods and services from the
Federal Republic. It also owed something to the very marked increase in
saving and to the very rapid gains in productivity achieved until quite
recently.
None the less strains persisted~ and in certain industries these have for
some time been growing more serious. Although more than a million
foreign workers are now employed in Germany and the number is still
rising, severe shortages persist on the labour market; production
capacity is almost fully extended throughout the economy, and this tends
to increase the difficulty of expanding domestic supply ; and the moderate
upward movement in prices that has already been recorded may well
continue.
The Bundesbank has therefore taken certain steps to curb the expansion
of the liquidity of the banking system and, more generally, to moderate
the growth of overall demand: from 1 August 1964 onwards, the minimum
reserves required of credit institutions ware raised by 10% and Bank
rate was increased from 3 to 3 1/2% on 22 January 1965. The Bundesbank
has also adopted a number of measures to prevent an influx of short-term
foreign capital and any additional borrowing abroad by the banks. The
reduction in the surplus on the overall balance of payments has under-
pinned this moderately restrictive policy; the net gold and foreign
exchange reserves of the Bundesbank have remained practically un-
changed. In 1964, the main features of the balance of payments were a
slightly lower surplus on current account than that achieved in 1963 andreversal in the net flow of capital. This reversal was due mainly to
the announcement that a tax on income from securities held by non-
residents was to be imposed, but an increase in the export of capital
also played a part. All in all, the basic balance of payments (i.e. the
current account plus long-term capital transactions) showed a deficit of
DM 642 million, compared with a surplus of OM 2833 million for 1963.
Expansion in terms of volume is expected to continue in 1965, though at
a slightly less lively pace than in 1964. One factor in the growth of demand
is likely to be a more rapid development of consumption by households,
whereas investment and exports are likely to move ahead rather more
slowly. Moreover ~ prices may well increase more sharply than in 1964
unless steps arE! taken to counter current trends in demand and costs.
The surplus on current account may be smaller than in 1964 or may
vanish altogether; it can be hoped that the policy being pursued will
enable net exports of capital to be maintained.
In these conditions the aim of economic policy should be to temper the
disequilibrium between real supply and demand in monetary terms.
The Committee is, however, aware that the scope for action by the Federal
authorities in the field of incomes policy is very limited.
In pursuing their drive to maintain equilibrium in the balance of payments,
the authorities should avoid any measure in the field of current payments
which would encourage exports. Again, action to curb capital imports and
especially, to encourage .capital exports should continue and even be
reinforced. Equilibrium in the external balance of payments will facilitate
the mild credit squeeze and any firmer measures that prove necessary.
It might also be found useful to limit the sums available for the financing
of building and construction, .as the continued excess of demand in this
field might, should it gain ground, imperil the balance of the Federal
German economy.
The Committee believes that the continuing harmcnious expansion of the
Federal German economy will depend more than in the past on fiscal
policy. In this respect it recalls the EEC Council's recommendation that
public spending should not be allowed to grow more than 5% per year, and
the wish expressed on this occasion that the 
II 5% rule II should apply to the
budgets of the Lander and of local authorities as well as to that of the
Federal Government. Although as it noW stands the Federal budget seems
to comply broadly with the rule, the danger that expenditure will in fact
rise above the ceiling is not to be ruled out since additional expenditure~
mainly in the agricultural and social fields, has been decided on.
The development of spending by the Lftnder and the local authorities
poses even graver problems, since growth is here well above 5% and
since the Federal Government cannot, in view of the financial independence
of the provincial and local authorities, at present implement a homo--
geneous and effective budgetary policy. The wisest course, therefore~ 
to pursue and step up measures to render tax .and budgetary machinery
more effective, though an adjustment of the legal situation should not be
ruled out.FRANCE
In 1964 F;rance made great progress towards the restoration of economic and financial equilibrium. The expansion of demand in monetary terms
slowed down more - and sooner - than the growth of real supply. Gross
national product at constant prices was up 5% on the 1963 figure, but this
figure was a result of the high initial level of activity; throughout the year the tendency was in fact for the rise in industrial output to lose
momentum.
Domestic demand expanded more slowly because of a more moderate
growth in public consumption and in that of households. In volume, the
former was 1.8% up on the 1963 figure, which had showed a 1.9% gain Over
1962, but the growth rate of private consumption dropped from 6. 3% for
1963 to 4. 7% for 1964 (1) - and in terms of value the slackening was even
more marked. This loWer rate of growth of private consumption reflects
a slower advance in the incomes of households and some strengthening
of the propensity to save. All in all~ the rate of growth of investment
showed little variation in terms of volume from 1963 to 1964: productive
investment by the public and private sectors lost a little momentum,
while the groWth rate for new housing was distinctly higher.
The upward price trend slowed down, partly as a result of government
action and of direct administrative controls. From November 1963 to November 1964 consumer prices rose only 2.3%, compared with 5.
for the corresponding period of 1962/63.
As in 1963, the growth rate of external demand was, in terms of value,
about 10%. On the other hand, importsof goods and services rose sharply, at least up to and including the third quarter, so that the surplus on
current account of more than FF 2500 million in 1963 fell to a small
figure in 1964. None the less, there was still a heavy surplus on the
overall balance for 1964. The maintenance of this large overall surplus
despite the reduced surplus on current account is explained by the size
of the surplus registered, as in 1963, by movements of long-term private
capital, to which must be added the surplus achieved by the franc area in
its dealings with the rest of the world, and the absence of advance re-
payments of public debts such as were made in 1963. Official gold and
foreign exchange reserves increased by FF 3 210 million~ compared with an increase of FF 4160 million in 1963.
The slightly smaller contribution of liquidity from outside, together with the restrictive pressure exerted by credit policy and especially by the
transactions of the Treasury, helped to slow down appreciably the ex- pansion of money and near-money supply~ which in the first 11 months
of 1964 rose only 6.4%, compared with 9% in the same period of 1963.
The sum of short- and medium-term bank advances increased by 7. from January to November 1964, compared with 8.2% in the same months
of 1963, whereas commitments by the Treasury to the banking system
and to the economy declined by 2.5%, where in 1963 they had risen by
12. 2%.
) August-September estimate.The budget deficit resulting from the implementation of the finance acts
and the amortization of the public debt was FF 60 million for the first
11 months of 1964, compared with FF 7700 million for the same period
of 1963.
The lull in economic activity is expected to persist in 1965, at least in
the early months of the year. The economic budget envisages an increase
of 4%  compared with 5 % in 1964 - in the gross national product. This
assumes a moderate recovery of foreign demand, a groWth rate in public
and private consumption comparable with that of 1964 and, from the spring
onwards, a definite improvement in private investment and in industrial
activity.
The French authorities still aim at narrowing the gap which may persist
between real supply and demand in monetary terms. Budgetary policy
has an essential role to play in this stabilization drive. The Committee
notes with satisfaction that in elaborating its budget for 1965 the French
Government has kept very close to the EEC Council's Recommendation
of 15 April 1964.
Short-term stabilization measures should, however, be supplemented by
efforts to improve the structure of the economy and thus to eliminate
those factors in its structure which force up costs and prices. A point
the Committee wishes to stress is the importance of establishing an
incomes policy. In the monetary and financial field the action being
taken to reform the organization of the money market and gradually to
place the public debt on a longer-term footing should be pursued ; con-
sideration should also be given to measures which would further encourage
private saving and adapt it better to the financing requirements of industry.
Lastly, in view of the persistence of a heavy surplus on the overall balance
of payments, largely due to net capital imports, the French authorities
should endeavour to step up exports of capital on an appropriate scale.
ITALY
From the early spring of 1964 the Italian economy began to recover from
the imbalances and strains that had beset it in the previous year. The
balance of payments showed a considerable surplus and the rise in prices
slackened. At the same time~ however, production and investment stag-
nated.
The uncertain trend of domestic demand had the effect, despite the rapid
expansion of demand from abroad, of limiting the real groWth of GNP to
about 2.5%, as against an increase of 4.8% in 1963.
While expenditure on consumption in 1963 had increased by 9% in volume~
in 1964 it grew by only 3%. This development can be attributed to the
slower growth Of wage and transfer incomes and also, no doubt, to the
weakening in the propensity to consume caused by the growing insecurityof the employment situation. The growth rate of public spending on goods and services also slackened and was slightly below 4% by volume, as
against 5.7% the year before. Lastly~ gross fixed asset formation di-
minished appreciably in the course of the year~ and in terms of volume
the total for 1964 was considerably below the figure for 1963.
The favourable world business situation and the efforts made by business- men to counter the uncertain trend of domestic demand by increasing
sales abroad brought about a faster expansion of visible exports in 1964,
growth by volume being 16% against 5.9% in 1963. The total rise in expOrts of goods and services was some 13% by volume, against 6.3% the previous
year.
Agricultural production showed distinct improvement after the bad har-
Vests of the previous two years~ but industrial production seems to have
made scarcely any progress in 1964 after the 8.6% expansion achieved in 1963; on the basis of seasonally adjusted indices it even showed some- thing of a drop in 1964. The level of production at the end of 1964 was
about 4% lower than at the close of 1963. Imports of goods and services
barely reached the 1963 level in volume.
Prices continued to rise, though more slowly; for the first ten months
the index of wholesale prices was about 3.5% and that of consumer prices
some 5.9% up on the same period of the previous year. The trend of
prices during the year, especially wholesale prices~ showed a tendency to settle down.
The balance of payments was marked by two different trends during the year: in the first quarter there was a heavy deficit of Over ~ 430 million
while during the rest of the year there was regularly a surplus, so that
the year ended with an overall surplus of about ~750 million. This fa-
vourable trend in the balance of payments resulted from an improvement in both current payments and capital movements. Among current trans- actions, exports showed in the first quarter an advance of some 11% over
the corresponding period of the previous year and about 17% during the
last nine months, while imports showed a year-to-year advance of 18%  the first quarter and then fell some 10% for the rest of the year. Capital
movements, which in the first quarter had resulted in a net outflow of ~9 million (compared with ~58 million in the same period of 1963), showed during the rest of the year a net surplus of more than ~ 300 million
(compared with a deficit of some ~ 300 million in the same period of 1963).
The improvement in the balance of payments enabled Italy to build up
its reserves again; it repaid to the International Monetary Fund the
gold tranche drawn in March and paid up ~57 million of its increased
quota to the Fund. The official gold and currency reserves went up by
~ 400 million in 1964, while the commercial banks reduced their foreign
indebtedness considerably (by about ~ 420 million).
Since April, developments in the balance of payments and of Treasury
operations have led to rather greater liquidity in the banking system.
This the banks used primarily to reduce their indebtedness abroad and
their commitments to the Central Bank. On the other hand, the expansion
of advances to business and private customers ceased in 1964, and therewas even a slight drop. At the end of November 1964 the total of bank
advances was 3% higher than a year earlier.
The monetary Committee notes the forecasts for the current year, which
suggest that the continued expansion of demand from abroad and the growth
of domestic demand will lead to some recovery in 1965. The trend of
domestic demand seems to reflect a net increase in expenditure on gross
fixed asset formation and on building and construction as a result of
steps taken by the Italian authorities. In these circumstances the real
gross national product may increase by 3  ro-
The Committee is glad to find that the stabilization measures taken 
the Italian authorities have had certain favorable results during the past
year. One of the major problems at present facing the Italian authorities
is clearly the need to put a brake on the increase in labour costs~ so that
stability of prices can be re-established~ a high level of employment
maintained, and the revival of economic activity ensured.
Until there is a policy which limits the expansion of incomes to the groWth
of productivity, and unless considerable adjustments are made to the
sliding-scale system, it may not prove possible to put an early stop to
the rise in costs and prices.
The high degree of elasticity of production, the distinct improvement in
the balance of payments, and the existence of substantial foreign currency
reserves should make it possible for the authorities to take the measures
that should counteract the recessive tendencies which have been observed
for some time and which have been leading to shorter hours in some
industries and some unemployment. The degree of success in encouraging
investment will depend on how nearly they succeed in keeping public
expenditure within the limits recommended by the Community s Council
of Ministers. This being so, the Committee welcomes the fact that the
Government's budget for  1965 respects the norms laid down by the Council
in respect of the growth rate of public expenditure, the appropriations
for public investment having been increased much more sharply than
those for current expenditure on goods, services and transfers.
NETHERLANDS
Internal economic stability in the Netherlands was subject to considerable
pressure in 1964~ mainly on account of the rise in income from wages.
Expansion was rapid: industrial production went up by 7.5% in volume,
agricultural production by over 10%, and value added in the services
sector by  7ro-  The growth of the gross national product at constant
prices was 7%, as against 3.8% in 1963.
The growth of demand in money terms was however much more rapid
than the expansion of supply" with domestic demand accelerated by theexceptionally sharp increase in salaries and wages (17% in the private
sector and 21% in the public sector) advancing even more rapidly than
demand from abroad. The level of investment has not yet been impaired
by the considerable rise in the wage level, gross fixed asset formation
rising by some 15% in volume against 3.9% the year before; it must be
noted~ however, that this high figure is in part a result of the slowdown
in investment during the particularly severe winter of 1963. Although
the effect of the sharp increase in salaries and wages was attenuated by the increase of some 5.5% in overall productivity and the measures
intended to contain prices Were strictly enforced, price increases gath-
ered speed. Wholesale prices rose by over 6% (2.2% the previous year)~
while consumer prices rose by 6.5%; the volume of private consumption
went up by 6%, as in 1963.
The value of imported goods and services grew by 17.5%. As the cor-
responding exports rose only 14%, the current account closed with a
deficit of some Fl. 750 million, while in 1963 there had been a surplus of
Fl. 350 million. Capital transactions showed a surplus, particularly in
the second half of the year. The overall balance of payments will con-
sequently have closed with a slight surplus in 1964. The foreign currency
held by the commercial banks fell, while official monetary reserves went
up by FI. 681 million.
In the first half of the year developments in the balance of payments
contributed to a tightening of liquidity on the money and capital markets.
Against this, the Treasury deficit and the increased short-term in-
debtedness of the local authorities helped slightly to increase liquidity.
In 1964 short-term advances made by the hanks to business and private
customers went up by some 12%; this went beyond the 10% limit agreed
between the Central Bank and the commercial banks. The Nederlandsche
Bank raised Bank rate in two stages to 4.5%. Special measures were also
taken to restrain the expansion of consumer credit.
The strain on the labour market will continue to be marked in 1965. As
the wage agreement which has just been concluded, and which means a
wage rise of at least 7% in 1965, will lead to a further increase in unit
labour costs, prices may well rise further in 1965, though less steeply
than in 1964. The balance of current transactions is likely to show a
smaller deficit than in 1964, but there will none the less be a deficit. In
real terms the GNP will increase by about 3.5%.
Reinforcement beyond certain limits of restrictive measures in the monetary and credit sphere could raise d.ifficulties, since any further
increase in interest rates risks being offset by inflows of capital. The
Netherlands authorities would then have to ensure that there were cor-
responding exports of capital. In the Committee s view, anti-inflationary
action should concentrate on budgetary policy and on measures to restrain
demand in building and construction, for this is one point from which inflation can spread. Continuance of the present strains could, in the
longer run, undermine the competitive position of those industries which
are most dependent on exports and consequently their growth The
maintenance or even the reinforcement of a policy of restraint seems
therefore to be in the interest of both internal and external equilibrium.BELGIUM
In Belgium the year 1964 was marked by increased strains, which led to
a considerable rise in costs and prices. Gross national product went up
5% in volume (3.9% in 1963), there was a perceptible increase in gross
public and private investment and a recovery in the public finances, and
the capital market returned to more normal operation.
The gradual rundown of manpower reserves led to further strain on the
market, at least until spring. The total wage bill rose more than 11%
from 1963 to 1964, as against 8.2% from 1962 to 1963. As demand 
money terms exceeded real supply, and both costs and the price of im-
ports (particularly raw materials) increased~ there was from the second
half of 1963 onward a significant rise in prices - more than in most of
the other industrialized countries. Though the upward trend slowed down
in the second half of 1964, the retail price index rose more than 4% for
the full year.
The rapid increase in household incomes brought about a market ex-
pansion of expenditure by private consumers: the growth rate was 10%
in value and 5% in volume. Government expenditure on consumption also
increased considerably, though not as quickly as private consumption.
The most vigorous increase among the various elements of total demand
was that in gross fixed asset formation, which rose about 10% in volume,
compared with 1.6% in 1963. But in 1963 investment in housing had fallen
off because of the exceptional length and severity of the winter. Foreign
demand also increased sharply in 1964, though it did slow down during the
second half of the year.
Transactions in goods and services showed a deficit of some Bfrs. 3 000
million in 1964, as against Bfrs. 4200 million in 1963. Net imports of
medium- and long-term capital by the public authorities were much the
same as the year before, while imports of private capital were con-
siderably higher. The overall balance of payments showed a surplus of
about Bfrs. 8 000 million, after the 1963 deficit of Bfrs. 600 million.
The net foreign assets of the Belgian monetary institutions totalled
Bfrs. 82300 million at the end of November 1964. 
Increased strain in the economy led the Belgian authorities to introduce
restrictive policies from the end of 1963, the effects of which have
gradually been making themselves felt. This policy involves the spread
of public investment expenditure over longer periods, some reinforce-
ment of price controls and a credit squeeze. Attempts to put a brake 
expansion of credits available to the economy made it possible to keep
the growth rate of domestic liquidity well below that of 1963. The Govern-
ment borrowed less from the banking system and the Central Bank,
mainly because of the increase in tax revenue.
In 1963 the national debt had grown by Bfrs. 23 000 million - Bfrs. 10 700
million of funded debt and Bfrs. 12 300 million of floating debt. In 1964
it increased by Bfrs. 16200 million, the funded debt having risen Bfrs.
18 100 million while the floating debt shrank by Bfrs. 1900 million. The
Monetary Committee has invited the Treasury and semi-official institu-tions to avoid increasing their short- and medium-term commitments
abroad, and suggested that the Treasury should continue its efforts to
payoff or fund the floating external debt. In 1964 there had been a tendency
for the imports of private capital to increase" and the Committee con-
siders that if this tendency persisted the Belgian authorities would be
well advised to  offset  it by increasing exports of capital. In this connection
it would' be well to recall the conclusions reached in earlier reports,
in which the Committee pointed out that the structure of public expenditure
needed to be altered and the methods of financing it reviewed. Although
undoubted progress has been made in recent years, too great a proportion
of budget expenditure in Belgium is still financed by borrowing. In order
to provide the domestic savings needed to finance the desired expansion
of the economy, the Belgian authorities should ensure surpluses on the
ordinary budget to help finance the investments envisaged in the ex-
traordinary budget.
The outlook for 1965 depends both on the extent to which domestic demand
is affected by the policy of restraint and on developments in the world
economic situation. Some slackening in the groWth rate of exports 
particularly to non-member countries  seems probable; gross fixed
asset formation, too, will increase more slowly than in 1964. On the
other hand, public and private expenditure on consumption will remain
high. Gross national product may go up nearly 4% in volume, although
the expansion of activity in some sectors has slackened of late. Although"
then, there may be some slackening of demand, it is not certain that
balance will be fully restored and there is still a risk that prices may
increase further, though at a more moderate pace than in 1964.
The Committee notes with satisfaction that in 1964 the Belgian authorities
reinforced certain restrictive measures, particularly in the credit field,
but it must be pointed out that such measures by themselves are not
enough to ensure the balanced, long-term growth of the Belgian economy.
Failing an incomes policy linking wage increases more closely to rises
in productivity (this might mean making some adjustment to sliding-scale
clauses), it is uncertain whether stabilization of costs and prices can
be attained in the immediate future.
LUXEMBOURG
After the negligible advance made in 1963, economic expansion in Luxem-
bourg has since the beginning of 1964 been very rapid, though the pace
has now eased. Reflecting the improvement on the world steel market,
the vigorous recovery of steel production  which accounts for nearly
two thirds of the country s total industrial output  led to a 6% increaSe
in GNP in real terms, as against about 1% in 1963.
The growth of domestic demand also helped expansion; private con-
sumption, particularly of durable goods and services, rose sharply 
a result of the large increases in household incomes. In addition, ex-
penditure under the 1964 budget will probably be some 15% up on actual
expenditure in 1963.These developments resulted in considerably heavier imports of raw
materials and finished products. The strain on the labour market in-
creased, and the consequent rise in costs (the sliding wage scale came
into operation twice in the course of the year) helped to send prices up
significantly, particularly in the services and construction sectors.
It is not yet certain whether domestic prices will tend to settle down in
1965. The Committee therefore underlines the need for vigilance, par-
ticularly as regards the movement of wages and prices. Luxembourg,
because of its dependence on other countries, can hardly avoid the
inflationary pressure that has been felt in the other countries of the
Community, but a rise in public expenditure such as occurred in 1964
will inevitably have added to this pressure. The Committee noteS with
satisfaction that the 1965 budget, in accordance with the Recommendation
put forward by the Council, is intended to restrict domestic demand and
that the authorities will put a brake on the money that is made available
for investment, particularly in the construction industry.ANNEX
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